124. The great and chief
end, therefore, of men uniting into
commonwealths, and putting
themselves under government, is the
preservation of their
property;
to which in the state of Nature there are
many things wanting.
Firstly, there wants an established,
settled, known law, received and
allowed by common consent
to be the standard of right and wrong, and the
common measure to decide
all controversies between them. For though
the law of Nature be plain
and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men,
being biased by their
interest,
as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are
not apt to allow of it as
a law binding to them in the application of it to their
particular cases.
125. Secondly, in the state
of Nature there wants a known and indifferent
judge, with authority to
determine all differences according to the
established law. For every
one in that state being both judge and
executioner of the law of
Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion
and revenge is very apt
to carry them too far, and with too much heat in
their own cases, as well
as negligence and unconcernedness, make them
too remiss in other men's.
126. Thirdly, in the state
of Nature there often wants power to back and
support the sentence when
right, and to give it due execution. They who by
any injustice offended will
seldom fail where they are able by force to make
good their injustice. Such
resistance many times makes the punishment
dangerous, and frequently
destructive to those who attempt it.
127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding
all the privileges of the state of Nature,
being but in an ill
condition
while they remain in it are quickly driven into
society. Hence it comes
to pass, that we seldom find any number of men
live any time together in
this state. The inconveniencies that they are
therein exposed to by the
irregular and uncertain exercise of the power
every man has of punishing
the transgressions of others, make them take
sanctuary under the
established
laws of government, and therein seek the
preservation of their
property.
It is this that makes them so willingly give up
every one his single power
of punishing to be exercised by such alone as
shall be appointed to it
amongst them, and by such rules as the community,
or those authorised by them
to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we
have the original right
and rise of both the legislative and executive power
as well as of the
governments
and societies themselves.
128. For in the state of
Nature to omit the liberty he has of innocent
delights, a man has two
powers. The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit
for the preservation of
himself and others within the permission of the law
of Nature; by which law,
common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind
are one community, make
up one society distinct from all other creatures,
and were it not for the
corruption and viciousness of degenerate men,
there would be no need of
any other, no necessity that men should
separate from this great
and natural community, and associate into lesser
combinations. The other
power a man has in the state of Nature is the
power to punish the crimes
committed against that law. Both these he
gives up when he joins in
a private, if I may so call it, or particular political
society, and incorporates
into any commonwealth separate from the rest of
mankind.
129. The first power- viz.,
of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the
preservation of himself
and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be
regulated by laws made by
the society, so far forth as the preservation of
himself and the rest of
that society shall require; which laws of the society
in many things confine the
liberty he had by the law of Nature.
130. Secondly, the power
of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his
natural force, which he
might before employ in the execution of the law of
Nature, by his own single
authority, as he thought fit, to assist the executive
power of the society as
the law thereof shall require. For being now in a
new state, wherein he is
to enjoy many conveniencies from the labour,
assistance, and society
of others in the same community, as well as
protection from its whole
strength, he is to part also with as much of his
natural liberty, in
providing
for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety
of the society shall
require,
which is not only necessary but just, since the
other members of the society
do the like.
131. But though men when
they enter into society give up the equality,
liberty, and executive power
they had in the state of Nature into the hands
of the society, to be so
far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the
society shall require, yet
it being only with an intention in every one the
better to preserve himself,
his liberty and property (for no rational creature
can be supposed to change
his condition with an intention to be worse),
the power of the society
or legislative constituted by them can never be
supposed to extend farther
than the common good, but is obliged to
secure every one's property
by providing against those three defects
above mentioned that made
the state of Nature so unsafe and uneasy. And
so, whoever has the
legislative
or supreme power of any commonwealth, is
bound to govern by
established
standing laws, promulgated and known to
the people, and not by
extemporary
decrees, by indifferent and upright
judges, who are to decide
controversies by those laws; and to employ the
force of the community at
home only in the execution of such laws, or
abroad to prevent or redress
foreign injuries and secure the community
from inroads and invasion.
And all this to be directed to no other end but
the peace, safety, and
public
good of the people.