John Locke  The Second Treatise on Government
        An Essay concerning the true original, extent and end of civil Government
        (1690)
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        123. IF man in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, if he be
        absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest
        and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and
        subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it
        is obvious to answer, that though in the state of Nature he hath such a right,
        yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the
        invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal,
        and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment
        of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This
        makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears
        and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is
        willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind
        to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates,
        which I call by the general name- property.

        124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into
        commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the
        preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are
        many things wanting.

        Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and
        allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the
        common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though
        the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men,
        being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are
        not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their
        particular cases.

        125. Secondly, in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent
        judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the
        established law. For every one in that state being both judge and
        executioner of the law of Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion
        and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat in
        their own cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness, make them
        too remiss in other men's.

        126. Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants power to back and
        support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by
        any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to make
        good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the punishment
        dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.

        127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of Nature,
        being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly driven into
        society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men
        live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are
        therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power
        every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take
        sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the
        preservation of their property. It is this that makes them so willingly give up
        every one his single power of punishing to be exercised by such alone as
        shall be appointed to it amongst them, and by such rules as the community,
        or those authorised by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we
        have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power
        as well as of the governments and societies themselves.

        128. For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he has of innocent
        delights, a man has two powers. The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit
        for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the law
        of Nature; by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind
        are one community, make up one society distinct from all other creatures,
        and were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men,
        there would be no need of any other, no necessity that men should
        separate from this great and natural community, and associate into lesser
        combinations. The other power a man has in the state of Nature is the
        power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he
        gives up when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular political
        society, and incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest of
        mankind.

        129. The first power- viz., of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the
        preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be
        regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of
        himself and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society
        in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of Nature.

        130. Secondly, the power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his
        natural force, which he might before employ in the execution of the law of
        Nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit, to assist the executive
        power of the society as the law thereof shall require. For being now in a
        new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies from the labour,
        assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as
        protection from its whole strength, he is to part also with as much of his
        natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety
        of the society shall require, which is not only necessary but just, since the
        other members of the society do the like.

        131. But though men when they enter into society give up the equality,
        liberty, and executive power they had in the state of Nature into the hands
        of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the
        society shall require, yet it being only with an intention in every one the
        better to preserve himself, his liberty and property (for no rational creature
        can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse),
        the power of the society or legislative constituted by them can never be
        supposed to extend farther than the common good, but is obliged to
        secure every one's property by providing against those three defects
        above mentioned that made the state of Nature so unsafe and uneasy. And
        so, whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is
        bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to
        the people, and not by extemporary decrees, by indifferent and upright
        judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the
        force of the community at home only in the execution of such laws, or
        abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries and secure the community
        from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end but
        the peace, safety, and public good of the people.