Posted: November 6, 1993
Q METHODOLOGY AND QUANTUM THEORY:
ANALOGIES AND REALITIES
Steven R. Brown
Kent State University
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| Abstract: Quantum theory was developed in physics in |
| the 1920s and '30s, has become increasingly popular as a |
| way of characterizing all manner of human behaviors, from |
| deep psychotherapy to organizations, but in most instances |
| the key concepts (e.g., complementarity, uncertainty, |
| chaos) have served as analogies only. Q methodology is in |
| striking parallel with quantum theory, but the similarities |
| are not analogical; rather, they are based on actual meas- |
| urements and virtually identical mathematics. The similar- |
| ities between the two are explored in terms of data from a |
| study on national identity. |
| |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
The Quantum Analogy
Once Einstein's theories began penetrating the public's thought,
they were extended by analogy to human activity -- as in cultural
relativity, value relativity, and so forth -- so that in virtu-
ally all matters nowadays anyone's point of view is considered
just as valid as anyone else's, and this implicates even scien-
tific theories (with obligatory bows to Thomas Kuhn). Some ver-
sions of postmodernism have been especially receptive to
relativism, with all manner of things being considered textual
and no textual interpretation being regarded as privileged over
any other. Now that quantum theory has reached popular levels,
however, terms such as paradoxical, indeterminant, chaotic, and
complementary are appearing with greater frequency and are in-
creasingly nominated as descriptors of choice.
Consequently, the race is now on to determine just how far
this quantum principle can be taken into human reality. Person-
ality, for example, is being conceived less as a collection of
stable structures (e.g., attitudes, memories) than "as momentary
forms of interacting processes, transient and insubstantial"
(Claxton, 1979, p. 417); consciousness is regarded as subject to
the quantum principles of the particles comprising the brain
(Wolf, 1984, 1985); the self is said to be quantum-like (Zohar,
1990), as are political values (Rasmussen, 1987) and law
(Eisenberg, 1992; Milovanovic, in press; Tribe, 1989). Even the
humanities have not gone untouched, hence the quantum elements
said to be in Joyce (Bohnenkamp, 1989; Booker, 1990; Overstreet,
1980) and Derrida (Froula, 1985).
What characterizes the above efforts in virtually every case
is that quantum theory is drawn upon as a metaphor or analogy
which is then superimposed on the phenomenon of interest. This
is ofttimes done purposefully, as when Booker (1990, p. 581)
notes "the overall similarity between the way Joyce uses language
and the way modern physicists use mathematics," but in too many
other cases the analogy assumes an unwarranted concreteness.
This was of concern to Popper (1981), who warned of the ideolog-
ical features of quantum theory, of its tendency to become
fashionable, and, apart from its scientific importance, of the
subjectivist interpretations which it promoted in an effort to
outdo the Einsteinian revolution, but which in reality stand in
the way of scientific progress.
These matters are brought to bear on Q methodology through
Morstyn's (1989) critique of Freudian psychodynamic models ap-
plied to deep psychotherapy. Morstyn accepts the applicability
of Freudian theory to certain psychic depths, but he says that at
some level the Newtonianism of Freud has to give way to quantum
theory;(1) yet efforts to link quantum theory to the study of the
mind have proven unsatisfactory: In the first place, according
to Morstyn, tying brain biology directly to quantum effects is
not genuinely metaphorical in the same sense as Freud was; in the
second place, the counterintuitive nature of quantum theory has
been used to justify mysticism and religious doctrine. On the
other hand, Morstyn continues,
...some investigators have borrowed metaphors derived
from quantum physics such as complementarity [22-25] and
quantum uncertainty [26] to investigate problems in psy-
chology and psychotherapy. However the major conceptual
issue of depth has been ignored. (p. 485, brackets in or-
iginal)
We will return to the matter of depth subsequently. For the
moment, however, it is important to point out that among
Morstyn's numbered references (in brackets above) are two by
William Stephenson (1986a, 1986b), being parts I and II of his
five-part series on "William James, Niels Bohr, and
Complementarity," which are lumped in with the analogical efforts
of others.
But Stephenson made it quite clear that Q methodology's con-
nection to quantum theory was more than an analogy. In one of
his last publications, he reflected on the differences between
himself and Cyril Burt, who conceived of factor analysis as
mainly a logical method: "in my view [Burt (1940, p. 94) said],
we should think of factor-analysis as a logical method rather
than as a mathematical method," i.e., as a method of logical
classification. Stephenson's view was different from the start:
I had been trained in physics in the early 1920s, and
for good reasons proposed that if quantum theory had to
apply to psychology, it must do so on its own grounds,
and not with purely analogic ties to physics.
(Stephenson, 1988b, p. 180; cf. Stephenson, 1981)
Even in the early 1980s, when he returned to this topic after a
40 year hiatus and first began giving it sustained attention,
Stephenson made clear that what he was suggesting was something
more substantial than an analogy: the operating principle behind
all that he had done -- communication theory, concourse theory,
the operantcy of factors, a solution to Newton's Fifth Rule --
had been "to make tangible what had previously been mainly an ex-
citing analogy between physics and psychology" (Stephenson, 1981,
p. 132). And in one of his final publications, he remained
equally unequivocal:
The present author introduced a new statistic, a new
"probabilistic" called Q-technique, in 1935, which corre-
sponded to that upon which quantum theory is based...,
and continued thereafter to bring quantum theory to bear
upon psychology, not as speculation and analogy, but by
force of experiment and determination of phenomena par-
ticular to psychology. (Stephenson, 1988/1989, p. 2)
The key, as we shall see, is to be found in measurement
(i.e., factor theory), which, in the mathematics involved, is
virtually identical in both quantum theory and factor analysis --
not metaphorically, but computationally, a fact on which Burt and
Stephenson were in agreement, and which Rummel (1991) has more
recently noticed. Complementarity in physics is not a metaphor,
but solely a function of measurement, and the same is true in Q
methodology.
Beyond measurement, there is a "remarkable parallel" between
quantum theory and Q methodology, which, were it not for measure-
ment, would relegate Q to the rank of just another "striking
analogy," as Bohr (1950) himself referred to psychology and the
complementary relationship between thought and sentiment. What
enables Q methodology to avoid becoming just another analogy,
therefore, and to stand on its own in a class by itself, is the
possibility of measurement and the hundreds of experiments which
measurement makes possible. (Q and R are distinguished not by
their computations, but in terms of what is to be measured.)
The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to elaborate
these points, primarily by reasserting what Stephenson has al-
ready said, fortified by yet another experimental demonstration.
Substantive and Transitive Thought
Stephenson begins his five-part series on "William James, Niels
Bohr, and Complementarity" (Psychological Record, 1986-1988) by
distinguishing between substantive and transitive thought. The
distinction was made by William James, in both his Principles of
Psychology (1890, p. 243) and in his "briefer course," Psychology
(1892, p. 160). Like the "alternation of flights and perchings"
that constitute the behavior of birds, so thought consists of
flights and perchings: "Let us call the resting-places the 'sub-
stantive parts,'" said James (1892, p. 160), "and the places of
flight the 'transitive parts,' of the stream of thought." Hence
the goal or end-point of thought is a substantive idea or con-
cept, something which achieves a degree of fixity or constancy,
although it may always retain a "fringe" of meaning, as when "I'm
sorry" is said to a judge, a priest, one's spouse, or the boss.
But there are gaps between substantive thoughts, as there are en-
ergy gaps in quantum physics, and these gaps are not void but
"intensely active" (James, 1890, p. 251), as when we are struggl-
ing to remember a name that temporarily eludes us. Despite gaps,
thought is not fragmented, but continuous, just as a stalk of
bamboo is continuous even though it contains joints (James, 1890,
p. 240): joints are part of the bamboo, and substantive and
transitory similarly refer to the two distinguishable features of
thought.
We may take as illustrative a recent inquiry into what it
means to say "I am an American," and into the feelings associated
with these meanings. This query was made of various citizens in
the wake of Operation Desert Storm, when American sentiment was
riding high, and it was introduced into a seminar on comparative
national psychology as a device for distinguishing what is objec-
tive about a people (e.g., "I am an American") from what is sub-
jective (e.g., "What thoughts and feelings arise when you hear 'I
am an American'?"). Ten persons were interviewed in depth, and
were encouraged to respond freely to the above, with whatever
came to mind. Snippets from one of the interviews provide a fla-
vor of the kind of material that was produced:
I think of yellow ribbons and red, white, and blue....
I think of all the freedoms we have, democracy, voting --
all the things we're taught in school.... I don't have
really deep feelings.... I obey laws and vote, but I
don't feel patriotic.... I don't think I would partic-
ipate in a war.... We're privileged in a material
sense.... We're a lot better off, and I like that.... I
wouldn't trade places with anyone else.... I wish others
could be as well off as we are.... I don't feel haughty
or arrogant.... There are lots of things I'm not proud
of.... I'm not emotional about it, but I prefer this to
alternatives.... The depth of my feeling surprises
me.... I'm not proud of the homeless, the status of mi-
norities, the poor.... The legal system doesn't always
work.... (etc.)
In Q methodology, such a collection of communicability is, as we
know, referred to as a concourse (Stephenson, 1978), and its
character under free-floating, unrehearsed conditions such as the
above is primarily transitive: it is flighty, largely unpredict-
able, spontaneous; no one knows what the person will say next,
not even the person herself (in the above case). This has noth-
ing to do with metaphysics or mysticism or logic, but is brutely
empirical -- i.e., the concourse is a purely empirical col-
lection; it is nevertheless "perhaps the most important concept
in the methodology" (Stephenson, 1980a, p. 99).
This particular stream of subjectivity begins stereotypically
("yellow ribbons"), perhaps influenced by Desert Storm; then on
to more substantial but still elementary thoughts ("democracy,
voting"); but then a hiatus -- a gap -- and the introduction of a
new thought ("I don't have really deep feelings"), followed
quickly by a justification ("I obey laws ... but I don't feel pa-
triotic"). The balance is then reasserted ("We're privileged....
I wish others could be as well off"); but then, as if in need of
another correction, "I don't feel haughty," followed by an ac-
knowledgement of deficits ("...things I'm not proud of"). Then a
paradox (given the previous assertion of lack of feelings), that
"the depth of my feeling surprises me."
Such are the flights and perchings of transitive and substan-
tive thought. Stephenson (1991a, 1991b) has clearly distin-
guished these in Joyce's Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, and we catch
a glimpse of this distinction as well in John Donne's The Flea:
Oh stay, three lives in one flea spare,
Where wee almost, yea more than maryed are.
Here, Donne is appealing to his lover not to kill a flea that
contains the blood of all three of them, and when he initially
tries to use the flea as an analogy for "almost" being married, a
stronger thought spontaneously imposes itself, at which point
"more than" supersedes "almost": "...yea more" is like James'
bamboo joint, which is different from the rest of the words while
being related to them.
Transitive thought is the raw material of Q methodology, and
it is the source of innovation and creativity in human life -- of
poetry, of psychoanalytic free associations, of solutions to pol-
icy problems, etc. For experimental purposes, however, we only
require a sample of it, and this necessitates falling back on the
artificial dimensionality of substantive thought. For this par-
ticular project, the conceptual framework consisted of principles
drawn from the personality-and-culture literature -- specif-
ically, from Erikson's (1963) theory of psychosocial development.
Statements were therefore categorized as follows:
I feel lucky, comfortable, and very safe. (basic trust)
I have no faith in the government. (basic mistrust)
I feel free to move about from place to place. (autonomy)
There are lots of things I'm not proud of. (shame, doubt)
And so on for Erikson's first five stages.(2) These categories
are of little direct interest ultimately: they provide the scien-
tist with the opportunity to be conceptually explicit and to pos-
tulate a starting point, but the "fringe of meaning" which the
words and phrases carry prevent them from being categorized with
certainty, which is why factor analysis takes precedence over
variance analysis in the analysis of Q-technique data.
From Ground State to Meaning
Stephenson (1980b) has repeatedly stated that "all statements of
a concourse are considered to be equipotential and equipossible a
priori" (p. 9), by which is meant that the volume of subjective
communicability carries no inherent significance or meaning with
it into the Q-sorting situation. This absence of meaning is
equivalent to the ground state of particle physics, i.e., the
lowest state of energy: We cannot know in advance what the sig-
nificance of each statement will be until the condition of in-
struction is given and the statements are compared with one
another in light of it. In short, operations must precede mean-
ing, the latter emerging from the former.(3)
What this involves can be illustrated in terms of the
concourse which was gathered in reaction to the declarative, "I
am an American." The resulting Q sort was administered to more
than two dozen individuals, and three factors resulted (A, B, C).
What was "equipotential and equipossible a priori" is therefore
replaced by three definite points of view about what it means to
be an American.
As would be expected, one of the factors (factor A) repres-
ented an idealization of America, as is readily apparent in those
statements which received higher scores in this factor than in
the other two:
I'm dedicated to what the country stands for.... I
can reach my potential; the only limits are ones I give
myself.... Individuals can decide their own desti-
nies.... We have made this the richest country in the
world.
Factor A has obviously attached its self to the political system,
which is positively valorized. On the other hand, factor B ap-
pears deeply troubled about the course of the nation, as shown in
the following positively assessed statements:
I'm ashamed that we are not doing enough to try and
solve social problems.... There are lots of things I'm
not proud of.... Our public values are disappointing.
It is to be noted that factor B, in agreement with A, asserts
that "I feel lucky, comfortable, and very safe," and that "I
wouldn't trade places with anyone else," and so B apparently
feels advantaged by virtue of membership in the political system:
it is for others -- the homeless, the poor, the elderly, the un-
healthy -- that B's heart goes out and that gives rise to B's
shame.
Rather than pride or shame, factor C expresses fear -- for
self, for the future, and for the young:
Crime is getting out of control.... Younger people
don't seem to have the same motivation and work ethic....
It's a wasteland for our youth.... I'm concerned for the
future.
The contents of a concourse are recognized and understood (if in
diverse ways) by all who are fully participant in a culture, so
that there is hardly anyone in the United States who wouldn't
comprehend the statements above: they are in the lingua franca of
the society, a matter of consciring and shared knowledge
(Stephenson, 1980b). The factors, however, are rooted in feeling
-- of national pride, guilt, apprehension, and no doubt others --
and it is feeling that supplants the initial equipotentiality and
leaves the imprint of meaning on the ordering of the statements
in the Q sort.
Uncertainty and Collapse of the Wave Packet
The "striking parallel" between quantum theory and Q methodology
is best illustrated in the context of a single-case study, as
when one of the subjects from the previous factors is asked to
operate with the same Q sample under multiple experimental condi-
tions. Scheibe (1983) asks, "What determines the manner in which
personal destiny and national destiny are intertwined?" and this
query gives rise to the following conditions of instruction
(among other possibilities):
Self: What is your own view about America?
Ideal: What would an ideal society be like?
American: What outlook do Americans have in general?
Media: What is the view of America transmitted through
the media?
Others: How do others (outside America) view us?
Future: What will my view of America be 25 years from
now?
There are good reasons for asking for all of these perspectives.
We naturally wish to incorporate the vantagepoint of the observer
(self), which is central to both special relativity and the un-
certainty principle (Cassidy, 1992) as well as to Q methodology.
Knowledge of what the viewer regards as ideal permits us to as-
sess the impact of yearnings and of the observer's degree of com-
fort with the existing state of affairs, i.e., of the observer's
adjustment (Rogers' Law) to the system. Related to the above is
the extent to which the observer feels a part of, or alienated
from the rest of society (Americans). The media condition is of
course designed to direct attention to the popular culture and to
the messages that the observer receives from the "inner space" of
society. Similarly, others draws attention to the voices from
"outer space," and to international perspectives (as seen by the
self). Finally, "America 25 years from now" (future) is designed
to bring the future into the "specious present" (Stephenson,
1988a).(4)
Quantum theory ended for all time the bifurcation of measure-
ment and thing-measured, or between knower and known, and this is
particularly salient in Q methodology under conditions of multi-
ple performances by the same person. Conversation between two or
more individuals will usually involve a relatively greater pro-
portion of substantive talk -- unless the relationship is one (as
in psychoanalysis) in which normal conventions do not pertain --
but the individual, in relative isolation, is apt to engage in
transitive thinking to a far greater degree. And to the extent
that the person is involved in self-observation (i.e., "measure-
ment," as in Q sorting), complementarity will be more prominent.
As Stephenson (1986b) has said:
Where phenomena involve the observer as in quantum
theory, the concern is inevitably with transitive
thought, and ultimately with self-referentiality, and it
is here that complementarity is sovereign. (p. 541)
Consider an individual associated with factor A above (with
loadings of 0.59, 0.32, and -0.06 on factors A to C, respec-
tively). The six Q sorts provided by Mr. A (when factor ana-
lyzed) produced two factors, A1 and A2, each well defined in
simple structure, as follows:
Factor A1: self, ideal, others, future
Factor A2: Americans, media
It is in terms of the mathematics of factor analysis that Q and
quantum theory dovetail, and almost exactly so. The mathematics
are the same, too, in R factor analysis, but what differentiates
Q from R is the phenomenon measured: Q measures states of mind,
as when a person represents (in a Q sort) the way he or she
thinks about something (e.g., myself, my country, etc.). R, how-
ever, measures variables in states (Stephenson, 1982, p. 237), so
that Miller and Friesen's (1984) "quantum" study of organiza-
tions, despite the use of "Q factor analysis," remains in the
Newtonian, and far from the quantum-theoretical mode.(5)
The factor analysis points to a basic segregation in A's
"mind," as if his mind possessed a preexistent "structure ready
for assimilation to various conditions of instruction"
(Stephenson, 1986c, p. 23). Factor A1 is the person's self and
ideal -- see the conditions of instruction (supra) -- which veri-
fies the idealization noted previously. That others (outside the
U.S.) also see us in this way indicates that everyone looks up
to, and idealizes us (i.e., as A sees it). The highest positive
statements reiterate the earlier idealization:
I feel lucky, comfortable, and very safe.... We can
practice our chosen religions and not be persecuted....
I can reach my potential; the only limits are ones I give
myself.
Mr. A's feeling of national pride is therefore projected onto
the otherwise meaningless statement sample, and this produces the
statistical distribution (from +4 to -4 in a quasinormal curve).
"It is at this point," Stephenson (1982) says, "that Q and quan-
tum theory coincide":
Quantum theory in physics begins with a Hilbert-space
vector and provides a probability distribution; in Q the
same holds. The Q-sorter projects probability distrib-
utions upon an otherwise undifferentiated concourse. It
is achieved because of lawful conditions..., imposed upon
situations by the conditions of instruction for Q-sorts,
comparable to the projections of vectors upon the
eigenvektorens of operators in quantum theory. (p. 238)
In sum, the statements in the Q sample are initially without
salience: they are equipotential in the same way that probability
is spread out in a wave function in particle physics, and the
factor A1 or A2 responses likewise remain potential -- i.e., un-
til a condition of instruction is given and a measurement (Q-
sorting operation) is made, at which point what was moments
earlier "dispersed sentience is suddenly concentrated" (Brown,
1988, p. 192), which is comparable to the collapse of the wave
packet in physics: one event assumes a probability of 1.00 while
others become 0.00. The Q sorter is the linear operator that
produces the Q sort.
Interpretation and Interference Effects
Mr. A's performances resulted in two factors (A1, A2), but Ms. B
displays an even more diverse segmentation:
Factor B1 self
Factor B2 ideal, Americans, others
Factor B3 future
Factor B4 media
Ms. B was among those defining the shame factor above, and so it
is not surprising to see her self on one factor (B1) and her
ideal on another (B2): how she currently feels about her country
is at odds with how she would like for her country to be ideally,
and these different feelings have produced different factors.
In quantum physics, light has a "split personality" (Horgan,
1992) -- the photons which given rise to electromagnetic radi-
ation behave like waves or particles depending on the measure-
ments taken -- and the classic wave experiment consists of
permitting light to pass through two slits. This two-slit exper-
iment results in alternating dark and light patterns being regis-
tered on a screen, which is evidence of wave interference, much
as occurs when boats moving in opposite directions create waves
that run into each other.
There is a comparable phenomenon in Q methodology. B's seg-
regation condenses around feelings of shame (factor B1, self),
pride (factor B2, ideal, other Americans), apathy (B3, future)
and apprehension (B4, media). Consider representative responses
of the first three:
+4 0 -3 (a) I'm ashamed that we are not doing enough to try
and solve social problems.
-1+4 -2 (b) We have opportunities others don't -- e.g., to
speak for or against the government.
0-3 +3 (c) I may obey laws and vote, but I don't feel espe-
cially patriotic.
The interference effects demonstrate how national pride (factor
B2) makes it difficult to identify with social problems (state-
ment a), how shame (factor B1) interferes with the capacity of
enjoy opportunities which the country affords (statement b), and
how apathy (B3) undermines both concern (B1) and patriotism (B2).
These are conflicting feelings in Ms. B, each being a
potentiality in her, and each, like Schrodinger's cat, lying in a
vague probabilistic state until measured or evoked by other na-
tural events in the social field.(6)
It is unnecessary to delve into the particulars of the case
representing factor C, except to say that the same conditions of
instruction produced three factors, to match the two from A and
the four from B -- the lesson being that the number of factors
emitting from a single individual is uncertain and unpredictable.
Concluding Remarks
William Stephenson invented Q methodology in 1935, and quite
early announced his intent "to bring the method of physics into
the realm of personality measurement" (Stephenson, 1936). As a
physicist (Ph.D. 1926, Durham University) and a psychologist
(Ph.D. 1929, University of London), he was uniquely equipped to
succeed. In his writings, he said very little about quantum the-
ory until the 1980s, but there is ample evidence that he was
aware of the implications at least as early as the late 1930s: in
the interim, he has said, it was necessary to carry out the re-
quired experiments so that evidence could replace "the mere ex-
pression of theoretical possibilities" (Stephenson, 1981, p.
132).
The number of experiments on human subjectivity now run into
the hundreds, and a fair number of them have been performed at
the individual level where quantum effects most clearly show
themselves. Q methodology therefore stands poised to perform a
role which no other procedure is in a position to provide --
i.e., to advance a quantum science of human behavior: it is
therefore positioned to realize Bohr's (1950) belief that there
are only two sciences: physics and psychology.
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Notes
Read at a meeting of the International Society for the Scien-
tific Study of Subjectivity, University of Missouri-Columbia, Oc-
tober 22-24, 1992.
1 The ideological character of the discourse is apparent in
Devereux's (1980) claim that it was Freud who introduced the
idea of complementarity in the truly scientific sense, hence
anticipating Bohr.
2 Oral (trust vs. mistrust), anal (autonomy vs. shame, doubt),
Oedipal (initiative vs. guilt), latency (industry vs. infe-
riority), and adolescence (identity vs. diffusion).
3 The situation is quite different with respect to substantive
thought, which is best exemplified by conventional rating
scales. In these latter cases, a concept or category (e.g.,
Intelligence, Liberalism-Conservatism) is known in advance,
and elements are introduced which are manifestations of it;
new meanings and understandings are therefore ruled out by
definition, and consequently are not equipossible or
equipotential.
4 The concept of specious present is attributable to James Ward
(1920, pp. 209ff), but is also in Harold Lasswell (1963), who
notes that "A distinguishing mark of subjective events ... is
referentiality, that is, referring in the present to events
that may be at a distance in time-space..." (p. 221); and,
citing Lord Lindemann, that "the subjective event of refer-
ence, by bringing models of the past and future into the
present, enlarges the context in regard to which behavior ...
occurs" (p. 236).
5 What distinguishes R from Q as methodologies is not the use
of R or Q factor analysis, but the measurement of objective
vs. subjective phenomena. Indeed, once this was pointed out,
Miller (1985) acknowledged that his approach "does not corre-
spond to Stephenson's.... We analyzed objective character-
istics of organizations.... In contrast, Stephenson's
approach represents a method for studying subjectivity" (p.
70).
6 "Schrodinger's cat" was a thought experiment initially in-
vented to counter the implications of Bohr's theory -- that
subatomic particles remained in an undefined probabilistic
state until observed (measured). A photon may go through one
slit in a two-slit experiment, or through the other; if the
one, the cat lives; if the other, it dies. Einstein believed
the cat's status (alive or dead) to exist independent of the
observer; the Copenhagen Interpretation, which won this de-
bate, maintains that the cat exists in a nebulous state of
neither dead nor alive until it is observed, at which time it
is immediately one or the other with probability 1.00. For
details, consult Rae (1986) and Brush (1980); the Q-
methodological implications are covered by Stephenson (1987).