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Political Psychology from the Standpoint of Naturalistic Subjectivity¹

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Abstract. Subjectivity is ubiquitous in social and political life, and is conceptualized in a variety of ways, most of them substantive, categorical, and dualistic. A summary is provided of the principles associated with the study of subjectivity as a natural science, as found in the works of Kantor and Stephenson, and procedures are illustrated in a study of national identity. Three separate identities emerge as operant factors, and these pristine events are described and explained in naturalistic terms. The study of naturalistic subjectivity is discussed in terms of its implications for political and social psychology.

Senses of Subjectivity

Subjectivity is a term that has become more prominent in social scientific writing within the past 20 years, but when we get down to examining semantics we soon come to realize that the term is used in a variety of ways and carries a variety of meanings. Sabini and Silver (1982), for example, list eight senses of subjectivity, among them bias, emotion, vantagepoint, and illusion; and Rosaldo (1994) contrasts subjectivity with detachment and equates it with passion. In many cases, subjectivity is regarded as substantive: Pletsch (1985), for instance, refers to *A*people who cultivate subjectivity@ (p. 358), as if it were in some sense voluntary or something that could be improved upon through effort, and Ellis and Flaherty (1992) consider subjectivity dangerous to the rational-actor worldview of mainstream sociology as if a rational worldview is other than a subjective position.

Behavioral psychology has for the most part sought to distance itself from inner-world conceptions of a substantive kind and generally dispensed with the problem of subjectivity by equating it with mental faculties and then ignoring it in favor of measurable events in the external world. But in his *The Study of Behavior*, Stephenson (1953) sought to rescue subjectivity from the mentalistic category to which most versions of behaviorism had assigned it, and also to avoid the substantive and mentalistic errors of faculty psychology while providing the study of subjectivity with

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a scientific foundation. It was a tricky operation fraught with dangers, but Stephenson was aided in this venture by staunch behaviorist J.R. Kantor, the founder of *interbehavioral* psychology, who, although no friend of subjectivity as a concept, did much to provide the intellectual foundations for psychology as a natural science (e.g., Kantor, 1938a) in which a nonmentalistic subjectivity could find a safe home.

Stephenson (1981, p. 37) distinguished between two dictionary definitions of subjectivity: (1) Consciousness of our own perceived states, which he rejected as categorical; and (2) the condition of viewing things exclusively through the medium of one's own mind, which he found acceptable so long as *mind* was taken to mean nothing more than from one's own standpoint, or the situation as I see it. From within the introspective mix of mental processes and covert events, therefore, Stephenson retrieved that which was empirical but which behaviorism had inadvertently discarded along with the nonempirical—namely, those self-reflections, assertions, and observations that fill most of daily life. Subjectivity in this sense is wholly above board and contains nothing covert, subterranean, or categorical; moreover, it fully complies with the tenets of Kantor's interbehavioral psychology.

For his part, Kantor (1938a, 1959, pp. 15-16) specified those ingredients which he considered both necessary and sufficient to constitute a *psychological event*: $PE = C(k, sf, rf, hi, st, md)$, where...

sf is the *stimulus function*, or action of the stimulus object. A rattlesnake puts us on notice by rattling its tail, and political candidates try to wheedle support by saying certain things in certain contexts. But a snake may do more than simply rattle its tail: its pupils may dilate, it may release adrenalin, and it may be the locus of a wide array of electrochemical events, few (if any) of which may be detected, and some of which may be unrelated to the snake's reaction to threat. Similarly for the politician, whose tenseness and animation may enhance the overall presentation, but who, for no reason associated with rhetorical performance, may also scratch an itch on the back of his palm or run his tongue over the inside of his teeth. (It is the purpose of instrumentation, such as stethoscopes and particle accelerators, to enhance significant stimulus functions that might otherwise go unnoticed.) Objects, in short, are the productive centers of large volumes of stimuli, many of which do not catch the attention of other actors.

rf is the *response function* of the organism. A rattlesnake's warning may go unheeded by a child who has never seen one, as will a politician's if the rhetoric is over the audience's head. It is not enough that an object can emit a stimulus; an organism must have the capacity to receive it for there to be a psychological event. The intuitive person is better able to interact with certain stimulus functions than are others, and the scientist's training facilitates stimulus interactions denied the untrained.

hi represents the *history* of interactions between *sf* and *rf*. A child may disregard a snake because it lacks a history with them, and the citizen who believes or disbelieves a political candidate does so on the basis of experiences, vicarious or real.

st is the *setting* within which $sf \leftrightarrow rf$ interactions occur. Even a normal adult may place a hand within striking range of a snake...if protected by the plate glass window of a zoo cage.

And how we act toward a politician may depend on whether we are at a banquet or watching the politician on TV in a rowdy pub.

md stands for the *medium of contact*. Without soundwaves, we cannot hear the snake's rattle; without CNN, we are less aware of what goes on in the U.S. Congress.

k is included to symbolize the *specificity*, or *uniqueness*, of all events (Kantor, 1978), which is as much the case in the natural and physical sciences as in the social sciences.

C specifies that all the above factors *interact*, hence the entire *field* must be taken into account (Smith & Ray, 1981; Smith & Smith, 1996). As the child gains experience with snakes, for example, it learns to discriminate the dangerous from the benign, when to remain motionless and when to slowly back away, etc., as field conditions warrant.

Both Political Science and Psychology are accustomed to explaining social phenomena by appealing to determining factors of a mental kind, as when political behavior is attributed to antecedent attitudes, emotions, cognitive mechanisms, and so forth; from a *naturalistic* standpoint, however, what is required to account for behavior is not to begin with presumed mental events as a basis for predicting external action, but, as Kantor (1938b) said early on, to engage in more thorough observation of *the behavior of specific individuals in relation to concrete objects and events* (p. 5). A cognitive psychologist, for instance, might explain an individual's impression of a political figure in terms of mental networks that have pathways, nodes, and links demonstrating varying properties such as strength and consistency, and these networks might be inferred by experimentally manipulating exposure to information of various kinds and then examining features of the person's recall (e.g., McGraw & Steenbergen, 1995). These cognitive networks and their traits are not only mental in character, but also regarded as *objective* in a certain sense. On the other hand, the student of naturalistic subjectivity would be drawn to the person's historical relationship to the political information provided and to its meaning when viewed subjectively, i.e., attention would be on *the behavior of specific individuals in relation to concrete objects and events*, or what Kantor (1959) referred to as *interbehavior*.

An Illustration: *American* Identity

The principles of a naturalistic subjectivity are best demonstrated in the context of an actual study, which combines Stephenson's subjective science with Kantor's interbehavioral principles. The case in point involves examination of the thoughts and feelings which people have when they reflect on the fact that *I am an American*.² One's nationality is a fact of a certain kind—a person is a citizen of

²With apologies to our Mexican hosts, who are also Americans: the label *American* is conventionally used by residents of the United States to refer to themselves solely. This is partly due to habit, partly to conceit, and partly to the fact that there is no other label that is linguistically convenient.

Mexico, for example, or China or the U.S. or some other country, and this fact is subject to proof and is independent of one's desires (i.e., it is non-self-referential) but people have different feelings about this fact that they share, and these feelings find expression in conversation, gossip, editorial-page commentary, and a wide variety of other social settings, including interviews. In one such unstructured interview, the following comments were made (by a female, age 52):

I think of yellow ribbons and red, white, and blue.... I think of all the freedoms we have, democracy, voting... Call the things we're taught in school.... I don't have really deep feelings.... I obey laws and vote, but I don't feel patriotic.... I don't think I would participate in a war.... We're privileged in a material sense.... We're a lot better off, and I like that.... I wouldn't trade places with anyone else.... There are lots of things I'm not proud of.... The depth of my feeling surprises me.... Justice isn't always served.... It's appalling how much it costs to get by.... I wonder what the future holds.... Nothing much really comes to mind.

And so on in endless profusion, and it is characteristic of subjectivity that it is boundless in this regard and infinite in its potential: In principle, this person could go on and on about her nationality, and without repeating herself, until the day she died. What thoughts might come into her head even she could not predict, and yet there is a certain determinism: Not just anything will come to mind. Inasmuch as what she says is subjective, it is obvious that we cannot apply standards of proof to her utterances (e.g., to her view that **I don't feel patriotic**) in the same way that we can to the fact that she is an American. Whereas facts are non-self-referential, therefore, subjectivity is self-referential.

Concourse and Shared Meaning

Characteristic of subjectivity is that it is generally *shared*, hence a matter of *consciring*³ (Stephenson, 1980). There is hardly an utterance that citizens of a nation could make about their national identity such as the comments above that would not be comprehensible by everyone else in the culture. One's subjectivity, in short, is typically expressed about ordinary things that everyone else understands to a greater or lesser extent. This is the raw material of such modern developments as discourse analysis, narrative analysis, and social constructionism, which are but the most recent manifestations of *consciring*.

In a naturalistic science of subjectivity, the volume of comment on a particular topic is referred to as a *concourse* (Stephenson, 1978), a term traceable to Cicero and referring to a *flowing together*

³According to the late C.S. Lewis (1960), who resurrected the term, *consciring* comes from the Latin *scio* (*know*) and *con* (*with*), thus to *know* something *with* someone, i.e., shared knowledge. From *conscire* evolved *conscience* (ca. 1350), which connoted a shared secret; and later *consciousness*, which implicated private rather than shared knowledge, as with Descartes' *Cogito* (ca. 1650), upon which cognitive science is founded.

from diverse sources, as when thoughts and discussion flow together during conversation. Concepts such as these imply a society and sociability, as well as subjective communicability among its members. These are natural phenomena which involve stimuli, responses, social settings, histories. Call unique, all interacting under field conditions.

For purposes of experimentation, a *thought sample* is drawn from the concourse of communicability, the goal being to create a stimulus situation that is as representative as possible of the universe of discourse (in this case, about American identity, but in principle about anything). The term *representativeness* as applied to stimuli was given substance in the work of Egon Brunswik (1949), who sought to correct an imbalance in psychological research which applied the principles of sampling to the subject domain only, thereby overlooking the fact that the stimulus-response situation depended for its generality on the representativeness of the stimulus side of the equation: Knowing how a suitably large random sample of respondents reacts to a single object provides no predictability about how that same or an equivalent sample would react to other objects from the same stimulus domain. Stephenson (1953) incorporated Brunswik's methodological innovation into his own framework, and drew on Fisher's (1935) experimental design principles as a practical way to assure representativeness (see Brown, 1970; Brown & Unger, 1970). In the context of the current study of American identity, self-referential comments were collected from depth interviews with many participants, and a representative sample of 40 such comments was selected. These 40 self-referential statements, to requote Kantor, are the "concrete objects and events" to which specific individuals are then called upon to respond.

Operations and Method

As indicated previously, Kantor provided a conceptual framework, but no system of measurement; Stephenson, however, did provide measurement procedures as the instrumental arm of his more comprehensive science of subjectivity, which he referred to as *Q methodology* (Stephenson, 1953). Q methodology has now achieved widespread use in a wide variety of fields, and at a purely operational level it requires individuals to represent their subjective views on a topic (such as their political identity), in this case by rank-ordering the statements from agree to disagree. Participants are assisted in this task by being provided a scoring scale (from +4 to -4) and instructions about how to proceed. This procedure, referred to as *Q sorting*, results in a rank-ordering of all 40 statements, by each of $n=27$ persons who participated in this particular study. Each Q sort is statistically correlated with each of the others, producing a 27×27 correlation matrix which is then factor analyzed.⁴ The three factors (in this instance) are indicative of three distinct conceptions of national

⁴Specifically, the Q sorts are correlated using Pearson's formula. For various theoretical reasons, the correlations are factor analyzed using the centroid method, and the factors are rotated judgmentally; factor scores (from

identity, which are described below.

Before turning to the factors, however, it is worthwhile summarizing what has been achieved in terms of a naturalistic treatment of subjectivity. A beginning was made at the brute phenomenological level of individuals expressing themselves about themselves as Americans in a relatively unguided and permissive atmosphere in which each person's natural inclinations were given greater sway, and according to Halliday, this natural language is not as it is dressed up in the form of a scientific metalanguage, but in its commonsense, everyday, spontaneous spoken form does in fact represent reality in terms of...complementary perspectives (p. 142). Hence the free-flowing outpourings of the participant quoted above contain divergent and often conflicting views: *I think of red, white, and blue...of democracy and voting...but I don't have deep feelings...I vote, but don't feel patriotic...I wouldn't trade places with anyone else...there are lots of things I'm not proud of...the depth of my feeling surprises me...nothing really much comes to mind,* and so forth. Thought in its spontaneous spoken form often jumps erratically like this when examined at the individual level and under unconstrained conditions, and in this sense does it represent reality not by providing a language-picture of reality (which was the goal of introspection), but by directly displaying the diverse and often inconsistent tendencies of the mind through language. This has given rise to conjectures concerning parallels between psychology and quantum mechanics, both in psychoanalysis (e.g., Devereux, 1980) and in the behaviorism of naturalistic subjectivity (e.g., Kantor, 1984; Stephenson, 1982; Zimmerman, 1979).

From the empirical collection of verbal expression was taken a sampling for experimental study, and this was administered to participants who were instructed to represent their own feelings (through the medium of Q technique) in reaction to the fact that *I am an American.* The Q sorts, although thoroughly subjective, are likewise empirical, as are the three vectors (A, B, C) which emerged from their factor analysis and which represent natural classes of subjectivity. These factors of *operant subjectivity* (Stephenson, 1977) have the character of *pristine events* (Kantor, 1983, p. 2), or *natural complexes*, as Buchler (1966) might refer to them: They are natural categories the existence of which is revealed through operation but with very little dependence upon operation.

The connection between Kantor's naturalistic formulations for a psychological event (PE) and Stephenson's Q methodology can now be rendered more specific:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{PE} &= \text{C}(\text{k}, \text{sf}, \text{rf}, \text{hi}, \text{st}, \text{md}) \\
 &\rightarrow \text{C}(\text{k}, \text{Q-sort } 1, 2, \dots n) \\
 &\rightarrow \text{C}(\text{k}, \text{Factor A, B, } \dots \text{ M})
 \end{aligned}$$

+4 to -4) are then calculated for each of the 40 statements in each of the factors. All analysis was by the QMethod software program (Atkinson, 1992) created for inquiries of this kind. Technical details are contained in Brown (1980, 1993) and McKeown and Thomas (1988).

A beginning is made with the statement that **I** am an American, a statement that contains unspecified potential (sf=stimulus function) to evoke various responses (rf) based on a person's experiences (hi) and the setting (st). The person's reactions are to some degree unique (k) and interact (C) both with themselves and all other features in the equation. The generality of Kantor's formulation is transformed (under the *principle of specificity* [Kantor, 1978]) by the particularity of the 1, ... n=27 Q sorts, in which specific meanings and saliencies are assigned to the concourse of subjective communicability miniaturized in the 1, ... N=40 statements. The diversity of the Q sorts is then further reduced and superseded by the parsimony of the A, ... M=3 factors, which function like X-ray plates in illuminating the tributaries of thought and feeling that have flowed into the concourse and have contributed to its character.

From start to finish, therefore, the conduct of inquiry is thoroughly naturalistic, with minimal influence from the investigator, whose role is mainly that of widwifing subjectivity by setting up procedures that induce it to display its structure and form.

Interpretation of Factors

The character of the factors is revealed in the *factor scores*, which are the scores (from +4 to -4) associated with each of the 40 statements in each of the three factors. Space precludes going into great detail, but consider those statements to which factor A assigned the highest scores (scores in the columns for factors A, B, and C, respectively):

- | | | | |
|----|----|----|---|
| +4 | -2 | -2 | I'm dedicated to what the country stands for. |
| +4 | +3 | -2 | I feel lucky, comfortable, and very safe. |
| +4 | 0 | +2 | Our accomplishments are a source of pride. |

As these statements and their scores show, factor A has a strong sense of pride and attachment to the country that is not as strongly held by factors B and C a sense of dedication, a feeling of security and comfort, and satisfaction in collective accomplishments. There is a marked congruency of self and collectivity, i.e., of *me* and *we*.

Factor B, by way of contrast, reveals a division between self and nation, as shown in those statements to which B assigned the highest scores (factor scores for A, B, and C):

- | | | | |
|----|----|----|--|
| -4 | +4 | -4 | There are lots of things I'm not proud of. |
| 0 | +4 | +1 | I'm ashamed that we are not doing enough to try and solve social problems. |
| -3 | +4 | +3 | We need to get our priorities straight. |

As noted above, factor B feels safe and comfortable herself (the factor was defined solely by women), but these scores indicate that the factor is concerned about those who are less fortunate the homeless in particular were singled out during interviews; this gives rise to shame and to a sense that priorities need reordering.

The scores above indicate that factor C agrees with B that priorities need to be reconsidered, but C's motivation for supporting this view arises from a different source, as the following show (scores for A, B, and C):

- 0 +2 +4 I'm concerned for the future.
- 2 0 +4 Crime is getting out of control.
- 2 0 +3 Justice isn't always served.
- 0 +1 +3 We take what we have for granted.
- 3 -4 +2 It's a wasteland for our youth.

As noted previously, factor C (contra A and B) does not feel comfortable and secure, and these scores reveal C's sources of anxiety to be rising crime, a breakdown in justice, destruction of opportunities for youth, and too much taking what we have for granted. Factor C believes that society has lost its moorings, hence the concern for the future.

In sum, close analysis reveals three outlooks and feeling-states in relationship to the fact that **I** am an American: *Pride* (factor A), *shame* (B), and *apprehension* (C).

Intensive Probes

Lasswell (1935) distinguished *intensive* from *extensive* probing points (the former epitomized by the psychoanalytic depth interview), and the deeper structures of Kantor's psychological event yield to greater clarity by moving in the intensive direction. For convenience, two participants from the previous study, one strongly associated with factor A (pride) and the other with factor B (shame), were selected for comparative purposes. So as to reveal the subjective segregations at issue, the two

Table 1
Intensive Structures

	Factor A (pride)		Factor B (shame)			
	A1	A2	B1	B2	B3	
self	70	-10	50	-06	-01	
ideal		88		-27	79	11
Americans		13	44	-30	68	01
media		-17	56	10	23	01
others		77	02	-02	50	22
future		78	-16	-21	26	52

Loadings in boldface significant ($p < .01$); decimals to two places omitted.

participants were asked to operate again with the same sample of 40 statements, but under five additional *conditions of instruction*, as follows (italicized labels keyed to Table 1):

Self: provide your own view (with respect to **AI** am an American[@]) by Q sorting the statements from agree (+4) to disagree (-4). [previously provided]

Ideal: provide what you would consider to be an ideal view, i.e., if this were a perfect country.

Americans: how do most citizens of the U.S. feel about their country?

Media: what image of the country is predominantly portrayed in the media?

Others: how do people outside the U.S. view us?

Future: what do you expect your view to be, say, 25 years from now?

As before, the Q sorts were correlated (separately, in a 6×6 matrix for each participant) and factor analyzed, with the results as shown in Table 1. The most immediate and obvious difference between A and B is that the latter is more complex—having generated three rather than two factors, with the *Media* condition being in yet a fourth dimension (not shown). Moreover, the Q sorts for *Self*, *Ideal*, and *Future* are all self-referential, i.e., each is a conception of the self under different conditions (actual, ideal, future); and for A all of these self conceptions are congruent, whereas for B they are divergent; i.e., A's political self is integrated, whereas B's is fragmented in three orthogonal factors. Of particular note is the discrepancy between the *Self* (factor B1) and *Ideal* (factor B1), which is the mark of dissatisfaction characteristic of B—i.e., a discrepancy between the nation as it is and a preferred nation. This dismal state of affairs is solidified in B's perception that *Americans* and *Others* (i.e., non-Americans), which are also on factor B2, share the belief that the nation is ideal, which only

contributes to B's alienation and sense of estrangement. For the factor A participant, by way of contrast, *Self* and *Ideal* are congruent, which is a prerequisite for pride and gives rise to a rosy and congruent *Future*.

The nature of B's factors can be glimpsed through examination of a few of the statements that distinguish each from the others (scores in columns for factors B1, B2, and B3, respectively):

+4	0	-3	I'm ashamed that we are not doing enough to try and solve social problems.
+4	-1	-4	There are lots of things I'm not proud of.
-1	+4	+1	I feel lucky, comfortable, and very safe.
-1	+4	-2	We have opportunities others don't. C.e.g., to speak for or against the government.
0	-3	+3	I may obey laws and vote, but I don't feel especially patriotic.
-2	-2	+3	Nothing much really comes to mind.

Factor B1 echos the *shame* of factor B discussed previously; factor B2 is the national *pride* denied B due to the self-shame of factor B1; and factor B3 (B's *Future* self) is politically *lethargic* and apathetic, hence B apparently sees herself as gradually losing resilience and giving up the fight.

With these behavioral segments laid open for inspection, we are in a better position to see B's dilemma and understand her conduct as a psychological event: PE = C[k, shame (B1), pride (B2), apathy (B3)]:

Her sense of *shame* (column B1 above) screens her from appreciating the positive aspects of her national identity: **I** feel lucky, comfortable, and very safe, **@**for example, only receives a score of -1, as does the view that **A**We have opportunities that others don't...**@**

Were she to embrace a more *patriotic* stance (B2), this might numb her to social ills requiring attention: **I**I'm ashamed that we are not doing enough...**@**and **A**There are lots of things I'm not proud of**@**get pushed aside (with scores of 0 and -1) when patriotic feelings assume prominence.

Under conditions of *apathy* (B3), which B sees looming in her future, both patriotic feelings and especially social conscience lose strength.

These are the interacting vectors, or response functions (*rf*), of B's political behavior, and are rival potentialities which she must balance (together with setting factors, *st*) in the course of fulfilling her social and political roles. They are specific to her (as symbolized by *k*); whether or not they are unique, on the other hand, is an empirical matter requiring further study. Her factors (B1 to B4), however, are segments of *naturalistic subjectivity* which existed prior to their measurement, but required measurement for their publication and elucidation. That this conceptualization and measurement can transpire without recourse to mentalistic formulations is testimony to the naturalism of interbehavioral principles as well as the operant character of measurement intrinsic to Q methodology (Brown, forthcoming).

Concluding Remarks

According to Ackermann (1985), what is required for progress in the human sciences is **not** simply more data..., as many empiricists have stated, but new instrumentation for obtaining data...so that more exhaustive explanatory possibilities can be tried@ (p. 169). For Ackermann, progress in science is inextricably tied to instrumentation which sponsors data domains only imperfectly accessible (if at all) by other means, and in this regard Q methodology, in tandem with the naturalism of Kantor's interbehavioral psychology, is well suited for gaining access to those subjective structures and processes which provide much of the energy of political life.

There is already an impressive list of successful applications in the field of political psychology, and some of the more recent bear mentioning. To the above study of *national identity*, for instance, can be added those by Davis (1997) on the Spanish Basques, Goldman and Emke (1991) on Canada, and Wong and Sun (1996) on Taiwan. At a more *clinical* level, mention should be made of McKeown's (1984) psychoanalytic essay and Rhoads' (1997) depth study of the authoritarian personality, as well as Thomas and Baas' (1993) and Felkins and Goldman's (1993) studies of public identifications with occupants of the U.S. presidency, and Gillespie's (1993) study of the personalities of third-party candidates. *Latin American politics* has received attention, especially by Peritore (1990; Peritore & Peritore, 1989). At the level of *role and organization*, Public (1997) has focused on the contributions of journalists to media hegemony, and Durning and Osuna (1994) have shown the ways in which policy analysts' values spill over into their roles; Q methodology has also been utilized within organizations as a decision-making device, e.g., in fashioning strategic plans (e.g., Brown, Durning, & Selden, in press; Gargan & Brown, 1993). Q studies of *public attitudes* and their connection to policy have been examined by Bratley (in progress) and Hill (1992). Q methodology has also begun to attract the attention of investigators wedded to various contemporary (i.e., postmodern) approaches, such as *social constructivism* (Curt, 1994; R. Stainton Rogers, 1995; Stainton Rogers & Kitzinger, 1995; W. Stainton Rogers, 1991; Stenner & Marshall, 1995), *discourse analysis* (e.g., Dryzek, 1994; Wong, 1996), and *feminism* (Febbraro, 1995; Gallivan, 1994). The diversity of these applications underscores Febbraro's (1995) recent observation concerning the generality of Q methodology:

... as a device for conducting scientific research, whether positivist, behaviorist, or feminist, Q methodology...has somehow obtained scientific legitimacy, by having convinced *all* the research **players**,@of varying epistemological, metatheoretical, methodological, and ideological commitments, of its value as rhetoric. (p. 149)

Febbraro's conclusion can be made even more general: Q methodology has managed to convince all research players of its value, *including students of rhetoric like Febbraro*, and it has done so by relinquishing control over meaning to the person performing the Q sort, thereby placing the person's subjectivity at the very center of the measurement enterprise. An important consequence is a reduction in explanatory reliance on the artificial social categories of the sociologist no less than the artificial mental categories of the cognitive psychologist, and their supersession by the functional categories of the individual, whether ordinary citizen, political revolutionary, logical positivist, or

postmodern rhetorician. In a methodological rather than a substantive sense, therefore, the self reigns supreme in Q methodology, and this makes all the difference.

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